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Abstract: As a religion, Islam provides values, ethics, norms and guidelines, but not a quick 
panacea, for Islam and democracy in Indonesia. So it is very important for Islamic scholars, leaders 
and Muslim intelligentsia to make their people be aware and conscious that the fundamentalism, 
radicalism and violence are the wrong answer at the wrong time to address the problems. 
Fundamentalism and radicalism with violent face are not the answer to tackle the poverty, social 
crisis, environmental crisis, global inequities and various multi-dimensional problems in recent 
years. Islam will be come in handy, useful and meaningful if it can make a real contribution as 
values, ethics, morals, ideas, thoughts, solutions and philosophy for the communities in addressing 
the real issues, so that Islam would be menaningful and useful in overcoming radicalism and 
fundamnetalism. Will Indonesian Islam be capable and credible in dealing with this challenge? It 
depends on its leader and ‘ulamā’s.
Keywords: Fundamentalism, Social crisis, ‘Ulamā’
Abstrak: Islam menyediakan  nilai-nilai, etika, norma dan panduan agama, bukan obat mujarab 
yang cepat, dalam  memahami Islam dan demokrasi Indonesia. Jadi sangat penting untuk 
ulama, pemimpin dan Inteligensia Muslim untuk membuat umat mereka menyadari dan sadar 
bahwa fundamentalisme, radikalisme dan kekerasan adalah jawaban yang salah di waktu yang 
salah. Fundamentalisme dan radikalisme yang berwajah kekerasan bukanlah jawaban  untuk 
mengatasi  kemiskinan, krisis sosial, krisis lingkungan, ketidakadilan global dan pelbagai masalah 
multidimensional dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Islam akan berguna, bermanfaat dan bermakna 
jika dapat memberikan kontribusi nyata seperti nilai, etika, moral, ide, pemikiran, solusi dan falsafat 
bagi masyarakat dalam menangani isu-isu nyata, sehingga Islam Iebih bermakna  dan bermanfaat  
dalam mengatasi radikalisme dan fundamentalisme. Apakah Islam Indonesia mampu dan kredibel 
dalam menangani tantangan ini? Semua itu tergantung pada pemimpin mereka.
Katakunci: Fundamentalisme, Krisis sosial, Ulama
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Introduction
In the late twentieth century, funda-
mentalism has emerged as one of the most 
powerful forces at work in the world, con-
testing the dominance of modern secular 
values and threatening peace and harmony 
around the globe. Indonesia as a center of 
social pluralism and multiculturalism has 
been target of terrorist attacks in recent years, 
reflecting a formidable threat to peace and 
stability in the capital town. Jakarta and Bali 
bombings in the past were the perfect crime of 
the movement of Islam fundamentalism that 
has been new horror in Indonesia.
There have always been people who, in 
every age and in each tradition, have fought the 
modernity of their day. But the fundamentalism 
that we shall be considering is an essentially 
twentieth-century movement. It is a reaction 
against the scientific and secular culture that 
first appeared in the West, but which has since 
taken root in other parts of the world. The West 
has developed an entirely unprecedented and 
wholly different type of civilization, so the 
religious response to it has been unique. 
The fundamentalist movements that have 
evolved in our own day have a symbiotic 
relationship with modernity. They may reject the 
scientific rationalism of the West, but they cannot 
escape it. Western civilization has changed the 
world. Nothing —including religion— can ever 
be the same again. All over the globe, people 
have been struggling with these new conditions 
and have been forced to reassess their religious 
traditions, which were designed for an entirely 
different type of society. 
Fundamentalist Groups & Democracy
Yet it remains incomprehensible to a large 
number of people. In The Battle for God, Karen 
Armstrong1 brilliantly and sympathetically 
shows us how and why fundamentalist groups 
came into existence and what they yearned 
to accomplish. The militant religiosity that 
we call fundamentalism has surfaced in all 
the major faiths in the twentieth century, 
and fundamentalism has emerged as an 
overwhelming force in every major world 
religion. It constitutes a reaction against and a 
rejection of modern Western society, but it is not 
a monolithic movement. Each fundamentalist 
movement has emerged independently and is 
a law unto itself, sometimes differing from (or 
in violent opposition to) other fundamentalist 
movements within a single faith tradition. 
The fact that fundamentalism has erupted in 
almost all cultures indicates a wide-spread and 
worrying disenchantment with modern society, 
which so many of us experience as liberating, 
exciting and empowering. Countries such as 
the United States, Egypt and Israel are deeply 
polarized, splitting into two camps, one which 
feels positive about secular modernity; the other 
passionately hostile to it. As the century draws 
to a close, these two camps appear to be in an 
incipient state of war, as witnessed in such 
incidents as the bombing of the federal building 
in Oklahoma; terrorist attacks on foreign 
tourists in Egypt, designed to bring down 
Mubarak’s government; and the assassination 
of President Yitzak Rabin in Israel. One of the 
most dangerous aspects of the fundamentalist 
phenomenon is that it seems incomprehensible 
to the liberal or secular world. The two camps 
within the same society scarcely speak the same 
language and have few values in common. 
Projects that can seem self-evidently good to 
a liberal —such as democracy, peace-making, 
1 Karen Armstrong, Battle for God (Guttenberg 
Project, 2000.)
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concern for the environment, the liberation of 
women, or freedom of speech— can seem evil 
or even Satanic to a fundamentalist. 
Recently fundamentalists have master-
minded critical historical events such as the 
murder of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak 
Rabin, the September 11 tragedy, and the 
frequent suicide bombings characteristic of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These are examples 
of the kind of dangerous activities in which 
fundamentalists are reacting to modernism. 
Though the perpetrators come from different 
religious backgrounds, they share a common 
characteristic that is religious fanaticism.2
Fundamentalism is one of the most widely 
discussed phenomenon of the 20th century. 
It has always been a part of the world views 
of radicals practicing the world’s major 
religions, not only Christianity and Islam, 
but also Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism and 
Confucianism. There is no lucid definition 
for the term ‘fundamentalism.’ Initially, the 
term was used by American Protestants in the 
early 1990’s to differentiate themselves from 
the more liberal Protestants. Since then the 
term ‘fundamentalism’ has been more freely 
used to refer to the purification movements to 
be found within all world religions. Therein 
all fundamentalist movements share certain 
approaches in that fundamentalism is a defense 
mechanism which arises as a reaction to a 
threat or crisis.3
The main argument in this book revolves 
around Armstrong’s conception of the world’s 
belief systems as being divided into two 
2 Karen Amstrong, The Battle for God: A History 
of Fundamentalism (Ballantine Books, 2001.)  
3 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (ed.), 
Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991.)
dichotomous categories: ‘myth versus logos’ 
and ‘the conservative versus the modern.’ 
Drawing on other social scientists work, she 
argues that humans have developed two ways 
of thinking and obtaining knowledge. Johannes 
Sloek similarly terms them ‘myth’ and ‘logos,’ 
in his book Devotional Language. Therein myth 
is a form of mystical knowledge, having an 
abstract supra-logical object, based not on fact 
and its truth capacity as determined by sense. 
Myth cannot be confirmed by rational evidence, 
while logos depends on it, i.e. rational, pragmatic 
and scientific form of thinking. Logos is related 
to the facts and external realities, consequently 
it can be proved empirically. 
Fundamentalist is a term used since the 
1920’s to refer to the most religiously conser-
vative group within Christianity.4  Within 
Judaism, Islam and other religions, the term is 
used to refer to the extreme conservative wing 
who Karen Armstrong defines as “embattled 
forms of spirituality, which have emerged as 
a response to a perceived crisis”— namely the 
fear that modernity will erode or even eradicate 
their faith and morality.5
4 Its roots in Christianity can be traced to the late 
19th Century as a reaction against liberal movements 
of Biblical criticism and analysis. A 1909 publication 
“The Fundamentals: A testimony to the truth” proposed 
five required beliefs for conservative Christians; they 
are listed above under ‘Evangelicals,’ items 1 to 5. 
Fundamentalists generally believe that other wings of 
Christianity, and other religions, are false. The largest 
Protestant denomination in the U.S., the Southern 
Baptist Convention, has recently transitioned to 
fundamentalism. Bob Jones University, the General 
Association of Regular Baptists, the Moody Bible 
Institute and other groups are also fundamentalists. 
Among the most generally known leaders are Jerry 
Falwell, Bob Jones and Hal Lindsey.
5 Karen Amstrong,  “Fundamentalism in 
Christianity & Islam,’’ The Wisdom Fund, at: http://
www.twf.org/ Library/Fundamentalism.html
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The term has three additional meanings 
in general usage that cause great confusion: a 
‘snarl’ word, used by some non-fundamentalists 
to imply intolerance, bigotry, lack of flexibility 
and an anti-intellectual bias. When applied by 
the Western media to Muslims, it often means 
‘anti-American.’6 When used by conservative 
Muslims themselves, it refers to a person who 
strictly follows the teachings of the Prophet 
Muḥammad, and who promotes the concept of 
theocratic government.
Karen Armstrong’s book, Islam: A Short 
History,7 is a concise, eminently interesting, 
and quite useful work of art. When the work 
comes out in paperback—and we hope it will 
somewhere down the line—we will use it 
as a class text. The first eighty pages are an 
introduction to the Prophet Muḥammad’s life, 
to the establishment of the Muslim community, 
and to the situations facing this community from 
the time of the Prophet’s immediate successors 
through the Umayyad dynasty and the early days 
of the Abbasids. We have yet to find a text that 
covers for students all the early Islamic historical 
information.We think it is important to cover in 
the amount of time we have, but Armstrong’s 
book ‘fails’ us only in one or two minor areas: 
we like a little more on Bedouin culture and pre-
Islamic Arabia. These short-comings are almost 
nugatory in light of how well Armstrong does the 
rest. The remainder of the book deals with the 
‘culmination’ of Islam, including the Crusades 
and the period of the Mongols; with ‘Islam 
Triumphant’ (section 4), which is an introduction 
to the Safavids, the Moguls, and the Ottomans; 
6 B.A. Robinson, Tolerance, Copyright © 1996 
to 2001 incl. by Ontario Consultants on Religious 
Originally written on: 1996-MAR-11.
7 Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (New 
York: Modern Library Chronicles, 2000),163-4.
and final section that looks at the difficulties 
Islam has faced in its increasing contact with 
the West. This last section includes a clear 
discussion of the move from agrarian societies 
to technological societies in general, and the 
difficulties concomitant when modernization 
is forced upon colonial lands: a situation faced 
by a number of countries with large Muslim 
populations. The explanation is helpful in putting 
not only Islamic fundamentalism into context, but 
any fundamentalism. And, as Armstrong points 
out, Islam was the last of the three Abrahamic 
religions to develop a fundamentalist strain. She 
presents fundamentalism as “a global fact that 
has surfaced in every major faith in response to 
the problems of our modernity.”8
Armstrong’s presentation of the problems 
facing ‘Alī and the early Shiite community is 
both sensitive and succinct. She weaves the 
development of Shiism in through a number of 
other topics, but she does so as well as any study 
we have seen, including much larger works. 
Although she only alludes to the miraculous 
powers described by authors like Amir 
Moezzi, she does include the eyesight (France: 
clairvoyance)  of many other authors do not 
even mention in relation to the Shiite imams, 
and she explains (again, clearly and summarily) 
how the Zaydis and the Ismailis split off from 
the Twelvers and the main philosophical tenets 
that distinguish them. It was in part because of 
the smoothness of this ‘weave,’ and in even 
larger part because of Armstrong’s sensitivity 
that the words ‘work of art’were chosen in 
the first paragraph above. She has taken on 
nearly all of the West’s unenlightened fears, 
criticisms, and misunderstandings regarding 
Islam (inferior status of women, the veil, 
8 Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History, 164.
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fundamentalist violence, polygamy...) and 
shown how they fit into the Islamic context in 
a manner that is lucid and compassionate. 
Armstrong, a self-avowed woman without 
religious affiliation, is here working to help us 
understand one another at the deepest level, but 
to do so without glossing over difficult issues 
and with the scholar’s insight. The West must 
bear some measure of responsibility for the 
development of the new radical form of Islam, 
which in some hideous sense comes close to 
our ancient fantasies. Today many people in 
the Islamic world reject the West as ungodly, 
unjust, and decadent.9 The new radical Islam 
is not simply inspired by hatred of the West, 
however. Nor is it in any sense a homogeneous 
movement. Radical Muslims are primarily 
concerned to put their own house in order and 
to address the cultural dislocation that many 
have experienced in the modern period. It is 
impossible to generalize about this more extreme 
form of the religion. It not only differs from 
country to country, but from town to town and 
village to village.10
We constantly produce new stereotypes 
to express our apparently ingrained hatred of 
‘Islam.’11 Another theme of the new fundamen-
talism has been an attempt to get Islamic history 
back on the right track and to make the umma 
(Muslim community) effective and strong once 
again. The Iranian revolution was not just an 
9 Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of 
the Prophet (Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1991.)
10 Michael Gilsenan has argued that the differences 
are so great from one district to another that the term 
‘Islam’ or ‘fundamentalism’ is simply not useful in 
defining the current attempt to articulate the experience 
of people in the Middle East during the post-colonial 
period.
11 Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of 
the Prophet, 42-3.
atavistic return to the past, but an attempt to 
impose decent values in Iran again.12
Western commentators often use —or 
misuse— terms taken from Christianity and 
apply them to Islam. One of the most commonly 
used is fundamentalism. As we know it, in its 
original application it means someone who 
believes in the fundamentals of religion, that is 
the Bible and the scriptures. In that sense every 
Muslim is a fundamentalist believing in the 
Qur’ān and the Prophet. However, the manner 
that it is used in the media, to mean a fanatic or 
extremist, it does not illuminate either Muslim 
thought or Muslim society.13 In the Christian 
context it is a useful concept. In the Muslim 
context it simply confuses because by definition 
every Muslim believes in the fundamentals of 
Islam. But even Muslims differ in their ideas 
about how, and to what extent, to apply Islamic 
ideas to the modern world.14
Mainstream Sunni Islam is possibly the 
most broad-based, tolerant form and certainly 
the one with the largest number of followers 
—almost ninety percent of Muslims are Sunnis. 
However, the Wahhābī school within the 
Sunnis believes in a strictly literal interpretation 
of the Qur’ān. It dominates Saudi Arabia, which 
has a small population of about ten million but 
huge influence because of its oil revenues and 
as guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and 
Madīna. This school would interpret everything 
in the Qur’ān literally: thus the chopping off of 
hands, death for adultery, and so on.15
12 Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Biography of 
the Prophet, 265.
13 Akbar S. Ahmed, Living Islam: From Samarkand 
to Stornoway (London: BBC Books,1993), 55.
14 Akbar S. Ahmed, Living Islam: From Samarkand 
to Stornoway, 18-9.
15 Akbar S. Ahmed, Living Islam: From Samarkand 
to Stornoway, 208.
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 Fundamentalism is a term popularly used to 
describe strict adherence to Christian doctrines 
based on a literal interpretation of the Bible. 
This usage derives from the late19th and early 
20th century trans-denominational Protestant 
movement that opposed the accommodation of 
Christian doctrine to modern scientific theory 
and philosophy. With some differences among 
themselves, fundamentalists insist on belief in 
the inerrancy of the Bible, the virgin birth and 
divinity of Jesus Christ, the vicarious and atoning 
character of his death, his bodily resurrection, and 
his second coming as the irreducible minimum 
of authentic Christianity. This minimum was 
reflected in such early declarations as the 14-
point creed of the Niagara Bible Conference of 
1878 and the 5-point statement of the Presbyterian 
General Assembly of 1910. 
The name fundamentalist was coined in 
1920 to designate those “doing battle royal 
for the Fundamentals.” Also figuring in the 
name was the Fundamentals, a 12-volume 
collection of essays written in the period 1910-
15 by 64 British and American scholars and 
preachers. In the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s, however, 
fundamentalism again became an influential 
force in the United States. Promoted by popular 
television evangelists and represented by such 
groups as the moral majority, the new politically 
oriented ‘religious right’ opposes the influence 
of liberalism and secularism in American life. 
The term fundamentalist has also been used to 
describe members of militant Islamic groups.16
Now that the Cold War is becoming a 
memory, America’s foreign policy establishment 
has begun searching for new enemies. Possible 
new villains include ‘instability’ in Europe —
16 Paul Merritt Bassett, Grolier’s Academic 
American Encyclopedia (Arête Publishing and Nielsen 
Media Research , 1999.)
ranging from German resurgence to new Russian 
imperialism— the ‘vanishing’ ozone layer, 
nuclear proliferation, and narco-terrorism.17
Topping the list of potential new 
global bogeymen, however, are the Yellow 
Peril, the alleged threat to American economic 
security emanating from East Asia, and the 
so-called Green Peril (green is the color of 
Islam.)18 That peril is symbolized by the Middle 
Eastern Muslim fundamentalist—the ‘Fundie,’ 
to use a term coined by the economist19—  a 
Khomeini-like creature, armed with a radical 
ideology, equipped with nuclear weapons, 
and intent on launching a violent jihad against 
Western civilization.
George Will even suggested that the 
1,000-year battle between Christendom and 
Islam might be breaking out once more when 
he asked, “Could it be that 20 years from now 
we will be saying, not that they’re at the gates 
of Vienna again, but that, in fact, the birth of 
Mohammed is at least as important as the birth 
of Christ, that Islamic vitality could be one of 
the big stories of the next generations?”20
Islam in Indonesia
Indonesia, where nearly 90% of the populace 
is Muslim, is the world’s largest Islamic country. 
17 Narcoterrorism is a term coined by former 
President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of Peru in 1983 
when describing terrorist-type attacks against his 
nation’s anti-narcotics police.  
18 Leon T. Hadar, University professor, and 
former bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post, describes 
the creation of the myth of Islamic fundamentalism 
by the US foreign policy establishment. See his work 
“The Green Peril: Creating the Islamic Fundamentalist 
Threat,” Policy Analysis No. 77 August 27, 1992.
19 “Fear of Fundies,” The Economist, February 15, 
1992, 4546.
20 “This Week with David Brinkley,” ABC News, 
December 29, 1991, transcript prepared by Graphic 
Journal, 6.
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However, Islam has never played a central role 
in the country’s politics. Nevertheless, there 
has been a persistent tension between those 
advocates of a more prominent and formal role 
for Islam in the country, and those who resist 
making Islam an organized political actor. In the 
late 1980s, under the now defunct New Order 
era of former President Soeharto, there was an 
effort to reach out to Muslims and Islam in a 
more explicit way. The main reason for this was 
President Soeharto’s desire to widen his power 
base beyond the military and the secular ruling 
political party, Golkar. A symbolic indication 
of this effort was President Soeharto’s decision 
in 1990 to make his first trip or Hajj to Mecca. 
Other steps on the path to Islamization of the 
New Order regime included reversing the ban on 
the wearing of jilbab (head covering) for female 
students in state-run schools and the founding 
of the country’s first Islamic bank. 
Roughly a decade after Soeharto’s attempt 
to encompass Islam in the political sphere, 
the New Order collapsed. On 21 May 1998, 
President Soeharto resigned. In essence, the 
effort by Soeharto to widen his political base 
by reaching out to Islam did not prevent the 
fall of his regime. While Soeharto’s efforts in 
the preceding several years to cultivate Islam 
may have re-invigorated Islamic groups and 
organizations, the current evolving role of 
Islam in the politics and policy-making of 
post-Soeharto Indonesia is likely to be more 
sustainable then it was at the beginning of 
Soeharto’s New Order era. A major reason for 
this expectation is that there has been, over the 
past decades, a surge in religious consciousness 
among many circles within the Indonesian 
Muslim community. 
A central point about the Islam in Indonesia 
is that it is not monolithic. A key divide, other 
than the differences between ‘traditionalists
,’‘modernists’ and ‘fundamentalists,’ is that 
between those working for the Islamization of 
Indonesia and those who wish to Indonesianize 
Islam. In some measure, the debates over the 
role of Islam in Indonesia have been between 
santri (devout Muslims) and the abangan 
(nominal Muslims.) The New Order era largely 
succeeded in suppressing this basic (and overly 
simplified) dichotomy. 
In the immediate post-independence period 
of parliamentary democracy, Muslim political 
parties did in fact play an important role in 
politics. A number of the Prime Ministers of the 
period were from the largest Muslim political 
party, Masjumi. But divisions and differences 
amongst the various elements that comprised 
the party led to the weakening of political Islam 
in Indonesia. 
As Sukarno issued in the era of guided 
democracy, the fortunes of almost all political 
parties began to flounder. The Masjumi was 
banned in 1960 on the basis of allegations that 
its leaders were active in a regional rebellion. 
Other Islamic groups also began to come under 
Sukarno’s control. The rise of the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI) and Sukarno’s growing 
support for it put Islamic parties and groups 
even more on the defensive. However, given 
Islamic cooperation with the military in the 
context of the fall of Sukarno in 1965, it 
appeared that Islam might yet again play a 
stronger role in the country’s politics. This did 
not materialize however. 
While working to diminish the role of 
Islam in the politics of the New Order, at the 
same time the government encouraged Islamic 
religious and ritual activities to flourish. Such 
encouragement took the form of government-
sponsored proselytizing, the increase in Islamic 
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publications and the construction of mosques. 
In essence, Soeharto’s New Order took a dual-
track approach to Islam. On the one hand, it 
resisted any political role for Islam while on the 
other it promoted Islam as a private religion. 
Between the political and the private, a 
third dimension of Islam in Indonesia has been 
its societal role. In this realm, Islam retained an 
important, and in fact increasingly influential 
position. For example, Islamic organizations 
as mass-based movements focusing on social 
and educational activities remained important 
aspects of the Indonesian landscape. However, 
as the two largest Muslim organizations, the 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama suggest, 
even as a social force Islam in Indonesia is not 
monolithic. Still three developments arising out 
of the societal role of Islam in the last decade or 
so of Soeharto’s rule have set the background 
to the role of Islam in the country today. First, 
members of the Muslim middle class are now 
culturally and intellectually more self-confident 
than their predecessors. Second, the Muslim 
middle class, while accepting that religion 
and society cannot be separated, including 
government and politics, does not support 
an Islamic state. Finally, there is a growing 
religious awareness amongst the middle class 
of Indonesia. The contemporary significance 
of such developments is that the long-standing 
distinctions between santri and abangan and 
between modernism and traditionalism is now 
giving way to a more complicated picture of 
Islam’s role in Indonesian society. 
Relations between Islam and the Indonesian 
military have been problematic. Many reasons 
have been offered to explain the troubled, and 
at times mutually suspicious relationship. First, 
some in the military elite have been unhappy with 
what they regard as the factious and rebellious 
nature of the Islamic community. Specifically, 
the military elite have suspected that Islam has 
been a motivating force in regional rebellions 
in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi to name 
but a few. Second, the military leadership has 
tended to be dominated by either the abangan 
Javanese or secular nationalists. The non-
Muslims in the military have tended to shy 
away from defining national identity in religious 
terms. Even more, the military leadership, in 
perceiving its role as the guardian of national 
unity in an ethnically and religiously diverse 
society, has tended to regard attempts by 
Muslims to express political interests through 
protests on economic and cultural grievances 
with hostility. Third, in terms of power politics, 
ABRI was inclined to deny a formal role to 
Islam out of concern that it would challenge 
the military’s prominent position in the New 
Order system of government. However, in the 
early 1990s and since, there appear to be the 
makings of a greater accommodation between 
Islamists and the ABRI. The ABRI’s suspicion 
about the Islamic community’s rebelliousness 
and tendency towards factionalism appears to 
have abated. 
In general, Islam has not had an important 
role in shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy. There 
are two main reasons. First, foreign-policy 
making has been dominated by state institutions, 
and non-governmental forces have not been 
allowed to tread on the government’s authority 
in this area. Second, Muslims leaders themselves 
have been concerned with a relatively narrow 
range of international issues; particularly those 
that have explicit Islamic dimensions or involve 
the Islamic world or the Middle East. This too 
may be changing. Emerging leaders in the new 
political climate of post-Soeharto Indonesia 
such as Amien Rais, the ex-leader of the 
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political party PAN, are raising questions about 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. Two compelling 
issues for these persons are the inter-national 
identity of the state and the country’s place in 
the Islamic world. Related to these questions is 
the issue of Indonesia’s relationship with the 
West. It is clear that new voices are emerging 
in terms of views on foreign and security policy 
in the new political climate, but it is not clear 
what these voices will have to say. However, 
it does not seem likely that the Islamic factor 
will emerge as a major factor or determinant of 
Indonesia’s foreign or security policy. 
Islam has not been a monolithic force in the 
politics of Indonesia. There have been divergent 
views amongst several Islamic organizations 
and movements, most prominently the NU 
and the Muhammadiyah. The New Order 
government’s policy of diminishing the role of 
political parties combined with the military’s 
suspicion of Islam, led Islamic organizations to 
concentrate on religious, social and educational 
activities rather than politics. This very shift in 
emphasis led to Indonesian society becoming 
more Islamicized, including the rise of a Muslim 
middle class that entered both the government 
and the military. These changes in part led the 
military to reassess its view of Islam’s role 
in Indonesia. Moreover, in the post-Soeharto 
context of Indonesian politics, Islam has 
emerged as perhaps the most important force. 
Islam is likely to be a major force in the politics 
of Indonesia for the foreseeable future.
Southeast Asia is clearly a sub-continent in 
turmoil. Here I would try to provide analysis 
on the situation in the Indonesian archipelago. 
The economic growth of the so-called ‘tiger 
economy’ has also been used by the bourgeois 
to prove the ‘spectacular’ and ‘progressive’ 
role of capitalism. But now the beginning of the 
Indonesian revolution collapse of this economy 
has put an end to the ruling group propaganda, 
and given a room for oppositional forces to 
improve condition.
Every ruling group in the world is faced 
with an opposition. In a real democracy, an 
important form of opposition can be found in 
representative assemblies such as parliament. In 
the present-day Indonesia, however, this kind of 
opposition is virtually non-existent because the 
people representative council (MPR and DPR) 
are representing only a small part of the people. 
Thus real opposition in today’s Indonesia is 
carried out by extra-parliamentary forces.
It is very important to analyze some of these 
forces in a systematic way. On the whole these 
forces can be divided into two broad categories. 
In the first one, opponents are ideological 
enemies such as, first, the crypto-communistic 
party, a PRD (People Democratic Party) which 
is derived from the spirit of the banned party 
PKI (Indonesia Communist Party) on the left 
and, second,  the radical Islam —and even called 
in notoriously ‘extremist’ or ‘fundamentalist’— 
DI (Darul Islam, Islamic State Movement) 
or TII (Tentara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian 
Islamic Troop) on the right who are striving 
for a nomocratic state which is in principle 
based on Islamic laws, shari‘a. In other words, 
what this second opposition leaders want is a 
return to the original ideals of the Rasulullah 
Muḥammad’s Madīna State as enunciated in 
the seventh century.
In the second category are elements which 
are, on the whole, of the same ideology with the 
leaders of the regime is called as a bourgeoisie 
opposition. They are anti-communist and 
they welcome foreign investments for the 
construction of the national economy. There 
are, however, differences of degree. The army 
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leaders, intellectuals, and student leaders in this 
category accuse the regime of having ‘sold out’ 
the national resources to foreign capital for the 
sake of ‘development.’ Some of the government 
leaders are profit taking from this state of 
affairs, as they received the commissions 
and kickbacks paid by foreign companies, 
which go into their personal bank accounts. 
Concomitant to this, the regime is condemned 
by these critics because of its rampant, wide 
spread corruption which has created general 
demoralization and cynicism (collusions, 
corruptions and nepotisms) thus obstructing 
the vigorous growth of the nation. In addition, 
the violation of democracy and suppression of 
civil liberties, such as the freedom of the press, 
form the target of attack of these critics. 
The mortal enemy of the Indonesian 
government is comprising of Islam and 
Communism the DI/TII and PRD/PKI. If we 
consider the PRD to be on the extreme left 
—like its predecessor— in the Indonesian 
political spectrum, then there is also opposition 
to the Jakarta regime form the extreme right. 
The latter is represented by traditional Muslim 
leaders who aspire to establish a Negara Islam 
(Islamic State), a state based on the precepts of 
the Qur’ān and devoid of the various aspects 
of secular Western culture in the form of 
nightclubs, casinos, massage parlors and the 
like which are at present mushrooming in the 
bigger cities of Indonesian. 
This group forms a minority considering 
the fact that officially nearly 90 percent of the 
population is Muslim and that the majority 
of Islamic leaders as represented in the NU, 
Parmusi, PSII and Perti—now all of them 
merged into the PPP— do not show a hostile 
and antagonistic attitude toward Western 
culture and its manifestations. For the purpose 
of this study, in the quest for implementation 
of shari‘a in Indonesia, are the Muslims and the 
non-Muslims doomed to clash violently in this 
century, or are there ways to reconcile the two to 
create a peaceful co-existence in the world?
Possibly as yet, we have not closely 
examined or truly under-stood the situation 
of Indonesia either through the mass media or 
directly, and we would probably feel amazed at 
how despite the size of the Islamic community 
there, it is historically and socio-logically 
capable of  establishing Daulah Islamiyyah 
(Islamic State) in Indonesia today.  The majority 
of historians write that Islam came to Indonesia 
by means of traders. There are those of the 
opinion that they came from India around the 
13th century, there are those of the opinion that 
it came from China around the 9th century. 
There is also the opinion of those who say 
that Islam arrived directly from the Arab lands 
around the 7th century CE. During the next 
phase of its Islamic development, many states 
of the Indonesian archipelago became Islamic 
kingdoms, including the kingdoms of Demak, 
Banten and Pasai amongst others; and shari‘a 
has been part of Indonesia from the beginning. 
It was through out these Islamic Kingdoms 
that there arose the spirit of self defense when 
the colonizing Dutch tried to forcibly take these 
Muslim States which were Indonesian. At that 
time the Dutch, who were notably Christian 
came bearing their mission of the 3G (Gold, 
Gospel [Bible] and Glory [Colonization]). The 
ulama and the young of the Islamic community 
who came from various backgrounds arose up 
to oppose the Colonialists with the irrefutable 
spirit of martyrdom (jihad.) The nature of 
the Islamic communities’ opposition at that 
time was indeed still regionally sporadic, and 
amongst those who led against the colonialists 
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are such are well-known names such as Imam 
Bonjol, Pangeran Diponegoro and Teungku 
Tjik Di Tiro.  As to the movement on a national 
scale, it emerged firstly in the year 1905 with 
the appearance of the SDI (Sjarikat Dagang 
Islam, the United Islamic Merchants) which 
was pioneered by H. Samanhudi. Following 
this organisation, came the birth of SI (Sjarikat 
Islam, United Islam) in the year 1912 which 
was pioneered by H.O.S. Cokroaminoto, and 
during the development of this organisation 
there arose the PSII (the United Islamic Party 
of Indonesia.)21 The movement was orientated 
towards the various aspects of life — political 
ideology, economy and social. By the means 
of a long exhaustive process, in the year 
1949, the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara 
Islam Indonesia [NII] or Darul Islam/Tentara 
Islam Indonesia [DI/TII]) was formed under 
the leadership of Imam Sekarmaji Marijan 
Kartosoewirjo until he was arrested by the 
Sukarno regime of the Indonesian Republic. 
This was achieved using the Muslim hostages 
as human shields (pagar betis) in their battles 
against the Muslim army (TII.) But, Imam 
Sekarmaji never surrendered to the secular 
enemy. Since that time until now some of 
the Islamic community in Indonesia —who 
understand these facts through many transitions 
and power shifts— continue the struggle to 
return Daulah Islamiyyah. This study will 
be interestingly to discuss how Indonesian 
triumphed over past Indonesian military 
21 The more interesting problem in SI movement is 
a new tendency brought by Semaoen who coloured this 
radical organization by the ideology of Communism. 
The organization split later, one is SI Merah (Red SI, a 
communist wing) and other is remained in Islam as SI 
Putih (White SI.) The struggle against Islam played by 
communist attracting many political scholars as they study 
deeply about the communist’s strategy of deception.
interregnum, and gracefully succeded under 
her current political dispensation.
The supporters of an Islamic State are 
spread all over Indonesia but there are strong 
reasons to suggest that their leadership was 
until 1976 based in the province of Aceh, North 
Sumatra, as embodied in the late Teungku 
Daud Beureueh. This is the veteran Muslim 
leader who, as a matter of fact, has always 
been in opposition to the successive ‘secular’ 
regimes in Jakarta since the beginning of 
1945 Independence. They consider that the 
Indonesian government is ‘Colonialist.’ The 
‘Colonialist Indonesia’ efforts, which were 
held by their cadres, were capable of expressing 
enough success in keeping Islam away from 
the native Indonesians. This started with the 
emergence of people in the Islamic Community 
of Indonesia both from within the ulamas 
(Islamic scholars) themselves, their own 
leaders, and lay people, who distinctly stated 
that they did not want Islam to be the basis of 
their nation. In fact they had already achieved a 
certain threshold of fear, which was enough to 
discourage those people who could have raised 
Indonesia as an Islamic State.22
So, in Indonesia today it can be said 
that there is nobody who clearly states that 
it is obligatory for the Islamic community to 
establish an Islamic State. There are those 
who oppose and compete against Communist 
22 The latest information which is important 
enough to reveal at this state of affairs is that Amien 
Rais, a son of Indonesia, who as leader of the 30 million 
members of Muhammadiyah (an Islamic Organisation 
which has some potential in Indonesia) is closely 
watched and respected, stated in the Time international 
magazine (September 23, 1996, Volume 148, No. 13) in 
an article entitled “The New Face of Islam” by James 
Walsh: “I don’t want to waste any energy talking about 
stupid issues like an Islamic State, we must have a 
Democratic System.”
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who yearns for the establishment of Indonesia 
as an Islamic State. They use various kinds of 
pretexts, amongst which is: “There is no order 
to set up an Islamic State’’ or “There is no 
āya or ḥadīth what so ever which orders us to 
establish an Islamic State.”23
But it must be revealed the current 
Indonesian constitution (UUD 1945) has 
provision for the shari‘a in the Djakarta 
Charter (Piagam Djakarta) and this study will 
revealed this point that dismissed the argument 
whether shari‘a is part of the Indonesian 
constitution and might be possibly to urge an 
Islamic State democratically.
Like Kahar Muzakkar or Daud Beureueh 
sympathised with the Darul Islam movement 
of S.M. Kartosoewirjo and TII which had 
respectively West Java and Kalimantan/
Sulawesi as areas of operation. Both had the 
same aim of establising a nomocratic stated 
based on Qur’ānic Law and both where 
suppressed by the Indonesian Army in the 
first half of the 1960s. If Kartosoewirjo was 
captured, brought to trial and later executed in 
1962. Kahar Muzakkar was killed in action in 
February 1965. 
Although it can be said that Daud 
Beureueh has been outside the Indonesian 
government since 1949, the transfer of 
sovereignty by the Dutch to the Indonesian 
people, his opposition to Jakarta was more 
vociferous when Sukarno was President in 
the period of Guided Democracy. The main 
reason for this was his anger because of the 
policies of Sukarno which were advantageous 
23 Mohammad Roem said, “There is no order to 
set up an Islamic State,” in discussion of launching 
Nurcholish Madjid’s  book, Tidak Ada Negara Islam: 
Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid (Jakarta: 
Yayasan Paramadina, Djambatan dan Panji Masyarakat, 
7 November 1997.)
to the communist, considered by Daud 
Beureueh as the infidels par excellence. 
The PKI was not only hated as an atheistic 
party but also as an enemy which aimed to 
liquidating the influence of Islam in Indonesia 
if given the chance. This confrontation 
between Islam, the state and the Communist 
has been attracking democracy observers 
about how their interpretations. Considering 
that democracy is not an event but a process, 
the Islam groups reinterpret the democracy 
practiced in Indonesia on pretext that was 
Communist’s and secular’s original creed.  
With regard to the New Order regime 
emerged in 1967, the criticism of the radicalist 
right-wing group is aimed at the ‘sinful’ 
proliferation of nightclubs, brothels in the 
camouflage of massage parlors or steambaths, 
gambling dens and other dubious attractions 
for tourists in Jakarta and provincial capitals. 
Within this context it is contended that the 
Government supported Golkar should better 
be called Golkur from Golongan Kuraish, 
the aristocrats in Mecca who were against 
the Prophet Muḥammad.24 Also criticism has 
been expressed against the policies of New 
Order President Soeharto considered to favour 
the Christian communities, Catholics and 
Protestants, in the country and to discriminate 
against the Muslims.
Within this last context a letter written by 
Daud Beureueh to the President on 10 August 
1974 is significant. In it the Muslim leader drew 
the attention of Soeharto to the fact that a wise 
and just leader should devote his attention to the 
wishes of the majority of the population. If not, 
this leader cannot be considered wise and just. 
He is then a leader who is zalim (tyrannical) 
24 Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, March 21, 1977.
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and a ‘stupid fool.’ History has shown that 
tyrants in the end will be destroyed so that this 
should be taken as a valuable lesson. Sukarno 
(the first President of Indonesia) was afraid of 
Islam and the forces which could be generated 
by the umma (Muslim community.) He looked 
for an opponent and enemy of Islam and found 
this in PKI. Sukarno incited the communist 
to attack Islam, so that the umma would not 
become strong. “But Allah intervened, you 
(Soeharto) were moved to destroy them (the 
communist) and finally also Sukarno and the 
communist whom he had encouraged and aided, 
were destroyed.” Daud Beureueh continued in 
his letter: 
Now I observe that you (Soeharto) are also 
afraid of Islam and the potentialities of its 
umma. You are now searching for an adversary 
of Islam. The communists are no longer here so 
that you have found the disciples of Christianity 
as a strong and powerful rival. What are you 
actually seeking? You encourage them, support 
them, you incite them to attack Islam, the 
religion of Allah, so that the umma remain weak 
and powerless. Secondly I also observe that 
you are keen on expanding your own personal 
power. But believe and I hope you would 
prevent history from repeating itself. What has 
occurred to Sukarno and his communist friends, 
could take place again. May however history not 
repeat itself and destroy you and your friends. 
Therefore, Brother, return to the real and correct 
path. You being a Muslim, help Islam and its 
umma. By doing this you would have placed 
the demands of the majority of the people 
high on the list of priorities without forgetting 
nor neglecting the other groups in Indonesian 
society. Trust and believe that your victory, 
power and greatness will be dependent for a 
great part on the majority of this country, the 
umma Islam. Only if you devote the necessary 
attention to it and evaluate it correctly, will you 
succeed in this and the next life. I hope that my 
advice and message will be of use to you.25
Needless to say this letter infuriated the 
ruling group in Jakarta in a tremendous way. 
It seems that the contents have never been 
published in Indonesia itself. Baihaqqi A.K., 
a lecturer at IAIN (Islamic College) Jamiah 
Ar-Raniry at Banda Aceh got hold of a copy 
of the letter and showed it to some people. As 
a consequence he was arrested and kept in jail 
for three months. In the end Daud Beureueh’s 
message to the President was apparently one of 
the factors for the later to advise the Indonesian 
Council of Churches (PGI) not to organize the 
fifth General Assembly of the World Council of 
Churches in Jakarta as originally planned.26
The opposition of Daud Beureueh to the 
regime is based more on moral forced than on 
armed strength. Differing from the Darul Islam 
and the Tentara Islam Indonesia of the 1950s 
and 1960s which were movements supported 
by armed units, the radical right-wing Islamic 
group has no soldiers under its command. 
It is, however, a potential hearth of unrest 
for Jakarta as the manifesto or proclamation 
(pronunciamento) of its leader could incite 
the Muslim masses and alienate them from the 
regime. The ultimate weapon of the movement 
is the threat of secession from the Republic.27
25 The letter is published in Impact International, 
London, May9-22, 1975.
26 See Indonesia: Feiten en Meningen (Amsterdam, 
June 1975), 13, as quoted by B.J. Boland, Pergulatan 
Islam dalam Politik di Indonesia, tr. (Jakarta: Grafiti 
Pers, 1984.)
27 This was once wielded by the same Daud 
Beureueh in the 1950s against the Ali Sastroamidjojo 
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At next phase there seemed to be a new 
version of the movement called the Komando 
Jihad (Holy War Command.) Some of its leaders 
have been arrested. One of them, Haji Ismael 
Pranoto, was brought to trial in Surabaya in 
September 1978. He was accused of having 
attempted to establish an Islamic State with the 
support of an army with its main base in Central 
and East Java near Blitar. At the end of the trial 
Pranoto was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Some Muslim circles contend that the Jihad 
Command is an invention of the regime with 
the purpose of discrediting the Islamic State 
supporters. If so, the trial of Pranoto is nothing 
else than a sham.
The biggest danger of Islam in Indonesia 
is not radicalist but fundamentalist who 
manipulates Islamic practices by the ultra-
right groups. This manipulation of Islam has 
been done by the ultra-right groups and the 
military by raising the sentiment of racism, anti-
Christianity and anti-Communism against the 
democratic mass movements, in several parts of 
Indonesia. Like the white terror in Banyuwangi 
East Java, Ketapang Jakarta, Kupang, Sambas, 
Mataram and other regions and the formation of 
the para-military groups to attack the students 
and people’s demonstrations.  Indonesia as 
the largest democracy in Southeast Asia is 
important to the United States and Western 
countries. If Indonesia goes down so does the 
sub-continent. The issue of shari‘a and Islamic 
State has to be addressed carefully.
Meanwhile the real Islamic forces grouped 
in Darul Islam are those which consistently 
oppose militarism. The Islamic groups in 
Aceh, Lampung, Tanjung Priok and others 
Cabinet and only skilful negotiations between Jakarta 
and the Achehnese prevented a national disaster at 
that time.
have held lots of demonstration to protest the 
massacre of their community by the military. 
Politically, they are also anti the Dual Function 
of the ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces.) So it 
is also important for the PRD to have tactical 
alliance with such Islamic forces to build an 
anti-militarism front.
In Indonesia itself, Islam is not a represen-
tative of a social class or political interest. It is 
divided into different political groups based on 
their social taxonomy. NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), 
for instance, represents Muslims whose social 
basis is peasant with the remnants of feudalism 
in political and cultural life. Muhammadiyah 
and ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals) represent the modern Muslim 
whose social basis are traders, intellectuals and 
professionals. Islam does not either represent 
a social class, because it has bourgeoisie, petit 
bourgeoisie and workers.
In Indonesian history, the Islamic poli-
tical parties like Masyumi and NU used to 
be a reactionary force which had roles in 
slaughtering millions of members of the 
PKI. But the other period of Indonesian 
history also shows that Islamic forces like SI 
(Syarekat Islam) were a progressive force. We 
cannot generalize whether Islamic forces are 
progressive or reactionary politically. And the 
fact is that nowadays there are Islamic forces 
which are anti-militarism and can be pushed 
toward the formation of the anti-militarism 
front. Indonesia is not facing fundamentalism 
as a real threat, but militarism and the civilian-
military or civil militia collaboration. This 
means that cooperation with Islamic forces 
which are anti-militarism as tactical alliances 
need to be taken by PRD to fight against mili-
tarism and to anticipate the scenario of civilian-
military collaboration. In short, the strategy at 
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the moment is to build a broad tactical alliance 
with all radical oppositions against the Habibie 
and Abdurrachman Wahid regime and military 
during 1996-2000 and the tendency of the 
bourgeois opposition leadership.
The betrayal of bourgeois oppositions 
has at least two negative impacts towards the 
democratization in Indonesia. Firstly, they give 
the old repressive power of Soeharto regime 
and the military which is already cornered to 
come up again on the political stage and do 
offence. Secondly, they moderate and lower the 
increasing degree of the resistance of the people. 
In short, they blunt the main contradiction in 
the society.
Under such Western type of civilization 
built by the New Order Soeharto administration 
of developments, it is no wonder if now the 
military rises their confidence. If in last 
November 1998 the military was the common 
enemy, now they do lots of provocation by 
shooting the cabs of demonstrators and drive 
their tanks to campuses. Under the name of 
securing the ‘free and democratic’ election 
supported by the bourgeoisie, they now 
become more repressive and provocative 
including by training 40.000 para-military 
personnel as guards and securing forces for 
the coming General Election on June 7, 1999 
and the Assembly.
Western society has changed the world by 
introducing a new type of civilization, based 
not (as in the pre-modern period) on a surplus 
of agricultural produce, but on technology 
that enables us to reproduce our resources 
indefinitely. This type of civilization depends 
upon a scientific and empirical rationalism, 
which is not constrained, as in the pre-modern 
world, by spiritual, religious or mythological 
values. It took the peoples of Western Europe 
and America almost three hundred years to 
develop this kind of civilization; it was a 
highly complex process that involved advances 
in several fields and on various fronts at the 
same time. It did not come fully into its own 
in the West until the nineteenth century. Once 
it was up and running in Europe, the need to 
continually expand the economy and find new 
markets led to the formation of Eastern colonies 
in Indonesia, the Middle East and Africa during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
These colonies then had to be modernized 
according to Western norms to make them fit 
in with this new Western-dominated economic 
network. It was at this point, therefore, that 
the non-Western nations began the process of 
modernization; it became apparent to them that 
the only way to take a full part in the new world 
and to shake off European hegemony was to 
Westernize. But modernization took over three 
hundred years in the West, and it was a painful, 
violent and dislocating process.
A New Cold War?
Indeed, “a new specter is haunting America, 
one that some Americans consider more sinister 
than Marxism-Leninism,” according to Douglas 
E. Streusand, “That specter is Islam.”28 The rise 
of political Islam in North Africa, especially the 
recent electoral strength of anti-liberal Islamic 
fundamentalist groups in Algeria; the birth of 
several independent Muslim republics in Central 
Asia whose political orientation is unclear; and 
the regional and international ties fostered by 
Islamic governments in Iran and Sudan are 
28 Douglas E. Streusand, “Abraham’s Other 
Children: Is Islam an Enemy of the West?,”Policy 
Review 50 (Fall 1989.) See also exchange of letters titled 
“Is Islamic Fundamentalism a New Red Scare?,”New 
York Times, January 29, 1992.
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all producing, as Washington Post columnist 
Jim Hoagland put it, an “urge to identify Islam 
as an inherently anti-democratic force that is 
America’s new global enemy now that the Cold 
War is over.”29 “Islamic fundamentalism is an 
aggressive revolutionary movement as militant 
and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi 
movements of the past,” according to Amos 
Perlmutter. It is ‘authoritarian, anti-democratic, 
anti-secular,’ and cannot be reconciled with the 
‘Christian-secular universe’ and its goal is the 
establishment of a ‘totalitarian Islamic state’ in 
the Middle East, he argued, suggesting that the 
United States should make sure the movement 
is ‘stifled at birth.’30
The Islam vs. West paradigm, reflected 
in such observations, is beginning to infect 
Washington. That development recalls the 
efforts by some of Washington’s iron triangles 
as well as by foreign players during the months 
leading up to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis. 
Their use of the media succeeded in building 
up Saddam Hussein as the “most dangerous 
man in the world,”31 and as one of America’s 
first new post-Cold War bogeymen. Those 
efforts, including allegations that Iraq had 
plans to dominate the Middle East, helped to 
condition the American public and elites for the 
U.S. intervention in the gulf.32 There is a major 
difference between the Saddam-the-bogeyman 
caricature and the Green Peril. Notwithstanding 
the Saddam-is-Hitler rhetoric, the Iraqi leader 
29 Jim Hoagland, “Washington’s Algerian 
Dilemma,” Washington Post, February 6, 1992.
30 Amos Perlmutter, “Wishful Thinking about 
Islamic Fundamentalism,” Washington Post, January 
19, 1992.
31 Brian Duffy et al., “Saddam: The Most 
Dangerous Man in the World,” U.S. News & World 
Report, June 4, 1990, 38-51.
32 See “Gulf War Coverage: A One Note 
Chorus,”Extra 4, No. 3 (May 1991.)
was perceived as merely a dangerous ‘thug’ 
who broke the rules of the game and whom 
Washington could suppress by military force. 
Saddam’s Iraq was a threat to a regional balance 
of power, not to the American way of life.
The alleged threat from Iran and militant 
Islam is different. The struggle between that 
force and the West is portrayed as a zero-
sum game that can end only in the defeat of 
one of the sides. The Iranian ayatollahs and 
their allies —‘revolutionary,’‘fanatic,’ and 
‘suicidal’ people that they are—cannot be 
coopted into balance-of-power arrangements 
by rewards and are even seen as immune to 
military and diplomatic threats. One can reach 
a tactical compromise with them— such as 
the agreement with Lebanese Shiite groups 
to release the American hostages but on the 
strategic level the expectation is for a long, 
drawn-out battle.
Indeed, like the Red Menace of the Cold 
War era, the Green Peril is perceived as a 
cancer spreading around the globe, under-
mining the legitimacy of Western values and 
political systems. The cosmic importance of 
the confrontation would make it necessary for 
Washington to adopt a long term diplomatic 
and military strategy; to forge new and solid 
alliances; to prepare the American people for a 
never ending struggle that will test their resolve; 
and to develop new containment policies, new 
doctrines, and a new foreign policy elite with 
its ‘wise men’ and ‘experts.’
There are dangerous signs that the process 
of creating a monolithic threat out of isolated 
events and trends in the Muslim world is already 
beginning. The Green Peril thesis is now being 
used to explain diverse and unrelated events 
in that region, with Tehran replacing Moscow 
as the center of ideological subversion and 
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military expansionism and Islam substituting 
for the spiritual energy of communism.
Islam does seem to fit the bill as the ideal 
post-Cold War villain. “It’s big; it’s scary; 
it’s anti-Western; it feeds on poverty and 
discontent,” wrote David Ignatius, adding that 
Islam “spreads across vast swaths of the globe 
that can be colored green on the television maps 
in the same way that communist countries used 
to be colored red.”33
Foreign policy experts are already using 
the familiar Cold War jargon to describe the 
coming struggle with Islam. There is talk 
about the need to ‘contain’ Iranian influence 
around the globe, especially in Central 
Asia, which seemed to be the main reason 
for Secretary of State James A. Baker III’s 
February stop in that region.34 Strategists 
are beginning to draw a ‘red line’ for the 
fundamentalist leaders of Sudan, as evidenced 
by a U.S. diplomat’s statement last November 
warning Khartoum to refrain from ‘exporting’ 
revolution and terrorism.35
Washington’s policymakers even applauded 
the January 1992 Algerian ‘iron fist’ military 
coup that prevented an Islamic group from 
33 David Ignatius, “Islam in the West’s Sights: The 
Wrong Crusade?” Out-look Section, Washington Post, 
March 8, 1992.
34 Thomas L. Friedman  , “U.S. to Counter Iran 
in Central Asia,”New York Times, February 6, 1992; 
Thomas L. Friedman, “Baker’s Trip to Nations 
Unready for Independence,” February 16, 1992; and 
Robert S. Greenberger, “Baker Is Wooing Central 
Asian Republics,” Wall Street Journal, February 14, 
1992.
35 The diplomat, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs Robert Houdek, warned the 
Sudanese that they would face ‘grave’ consequences 
if an international terror is act could be traced to 
Sudan. See Jane Perlez, “Sudan Is Seen as Safe Base 
for Mideast Terror Groups,”New York Times, January 
26, 1992.
winning the elections. The notion that we have 
to stop the fundamentalists somewhere echoes 
the Cold War’s domino theory.
“Geopolitically, Iran’s targets are four—the 
Central Asian republics, the Maghreb or North 
Africa, Egypt and other neigh-boring Arab 
countries, and the Persian Gulf states,” explained 
Hoover Institution senior fellow Arnold 
Beichman, who is raising the Muslim alarm. 
Beichman suggested that ‘the first major target’ 
for radical Iran and its militant strategy would be 
“oil-rich, militarily weak Saudi Arabia, keeper 
of Islam’s holy places and OPEC’s decision 
maker on world oil prices.”36  If the West does 
not meet that challenge, a Green Curtain will 
be drawn across the crescent of instability, and 
“the Middle East and the once Soviet Central 
Asian republics could become in a few years 
the cultural and political dependencies of the 
most expansionist militarized regime in the 
world today, a regime for which terrorism is a 
governing norm,” he warned.37
The Islamic threat argument is becoming 
increasingly popular with some segments of the 
American foreign policy establishment. They 
are encouraged by foreign governments who, for 
reasons of self-interest, want to see Washington 
embroiled in the coming West vs. Islam 
confrontation. The result is the construction of 
the new peril, a process that does not reflect any 
grand conspiracy but that nevertheless has its 
own logic, rules and timetables.
The creation of a peril usually starts with 
mysterious ‘sources’ and unnamed officials 
who leak information, float trial balloons, and 
warn about the coming threat. Those sources 
reflect debates and discussions taking place 
36 Arnold Beichman, “Iran’s Covetous Glances,” 
Washington Times, February 28, 1992.
37 Arnold Beichman, “Iran’s Covetous Glances.”
324       �� �� ������������ , Volume 2, Nomor 4, Juli 2015
within government. Their information is then 
augmented by colorful intelligence reports that 
finger exotic and conspiratorial terrorists and 
military advisers. Journalists then search for 
the named and other villains. The media end up 
finding corroboration from foreign sources who 
form an informal coalition with the sources in 
the U.S. government and help the press uncover 
further information substantiating the threat 
coming from the new bad guys.
In addition, think tanks studies add 
momentum to the official spin. Their publication 
is followed by congressional hearings, policy 
conferences, and public press briefings. A 
governmental policy debate ensues, producing 
studies, working papers, and eventually 
doctrines and policies that become part of the 
media’s spin. The new villain is now ready to 
be integrated into the popular culture to help 
to mobilize public support for a new crusade. 
In the case of the Green Peril, that process has 
been under way for several months.38
38 See, for example, Barbara Crossette, “U.S. 
Aide Calls Muslim Militants Big Concern,”New 
York Times, January 1, 1992; David Ignatius, 
“U.S. Fears Sudan Becoming Terrorists’‘New 
Lebanon,’”Washington Post, January 31, 1992; 
Perlez, “Sudan Seen as Safe Base for Mideast Terror 
Groups”; and Robert S. Greenberger, “Islamic 
Fundamentalism’s Rise in Sudan Sparks Concern 
over Movement’s Spread,”Wall Street Journal, 
March 16, 1992; Jennifer Parmelee, “Sudan Denies 
‘Khartoum-Tehran Axis’ to Promote Islamic 
Regimes in Africa,”Washington Post, March 12, 
1992; John J. Fialka, “For mer Soviet Republics of 
South-Central Asia Have Nuclear Arms, Links with 
Volatile Lands,”Wall Street Journal, October 9, 
1991; Craig Forman, “Islamic Resurgence Sweeps 
SovietSouth,”Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1991; 
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Ignoring 
Tehran’s Threat,” Washington Post, March 2, 1992; 
Elaine Sciolino, “Iraqis Could Pose a Threat Soon, 
CIA Chief Says,”New York Times, January 16, 
1992; and Gerald F. Seib, “The New Order: Iran 
A series of leaks, signals, and trial balloons 
is already beginning to shape U.S. agenda 
and policy. Congress is about to conduct 
several hearings on the global threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism.39 The George W. 
Bush administration has been trying to devise 
policies and establish new alliances to counter 
Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden Network 
influence: building up Islamic but secular and 
pro-Western Pakistan as a countervailing force 
in Central Asia, expanding U.S. commitments 
to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan,  warning 
Indonesia that it faces grave consequences as 
a result of its policies. 
Civilizational Dialogues
The international community has seen 
that the fundamentalists have gunned down 
worshippers in a mosque, have killed doctors 
and nurses who work in abortion clinics, 
have shot their presidents, and have even 
toppled a powerful government. It is only 
a small minority of fundamentalists who 
commit such acts of terror, but even the most 
peaceful and law-abiding are perplexing, 
because they seem so adamantly opposed to 
many of the most positive values of modern 
society. Fundamentalists have no time for 
democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, 
peacekeeping, free speech, or the separation 
of church and state.40
Is Re-emerging as a Mideast Power as Iraqi Threat 
Fades,”Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1992.
39 Crossette, “U.S. Aide Calls Muslim Militants 
Big Concern.”
40 Christian fundamentalists reject the disco-
veries of biology and physics about the origins of life 
and insist that the Book of Genesis is scientifically 
sound in every detail. At a time when many are 
throwing off the shackles of the past, Jewish 
fundamentalists observe their revealed Law more 
stringently than ever before, and Muslim women, 
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History has shown to us that in the era Cold 
War and after-math, it is not only Muslim and 
Christian who have been the fundamentalists. 
There are Buddhist, Hindu, and even Confucian 
fundamentalisms, which also cast aside many 
of the painfully acquired insights of liberal 
culture, which fight and kill in the name of 
religion and strive to bring the sacred into the 
realm of politics and national struggle. This 
religious resurgence has taken many observers 
by surprise. In the middle years of the twentieth 
century, it was generally taken for granted that 
secularism was an irreversible trend and that 
faith would never again play a major part in 
world events. It was assumed that as human 
beings became more rational, they either would 
have no further need for religion or would 
be content to confine it to the immediately 
personal and private areas of their lives. But in 
the late 1970s, fundamentalists began to rebel 
against this secularist hegemony and started to 
wrest religion out of its marginal position and 
back to center stage. In this, at least, they have 
enjoyed remarkable success. Religion has once 
again become a force that no government can 
safely ignore. 
In Indonesia, many intellectuals and 
academicians have opinion that the WTC 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Bali 
Bombing 2002 and 2005 and so on, has 
encouraged the need for the significance of 
cultural and civilizational dialogues between 
Islam and the West. There is strong tendency 
that the cultural-civilizational dialogues 
between the West and Islamic societies have 
repudiating the freedoms of Western women, shroud 
themselves in veils and chadors. Muslim and Jewish 
fundamentalists both interpret the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which began as defiantly secularist, in an 
exclusively religious way. 
gained growing importance after the tragedy 
of Black September. 
In this regard, development cooperation 
is imperative for the West and Islamic World. 
It is largely equal to politics beyond cultural 
borders and depends upon building bridges 
between cultures-civilizations of the West and 
islamic world, and finding ways of cultural 
and civilizational understanding in order to 
enter into a dialogue about ethical, religious, 
and political differences and similarites with 
others cultures-civilizations and in respone 
to the criticism which since then has been 
expressed in islamic societies about Western 
politics towards developing countries.
The relationship between the West and 
Islam has been suffering from mutual wrong 
perception of each other which support anti 
western and anti Islamic feelings and attitudes. 
Each others cultures are predominantly 
interpreted as a monolitihic enemy and not, as 
it should be, an area of cultural deversity. For 
a long time, said Norbert Eschborn (a Germany 
scholar),  the neighbor like relationship 
between Western and Islamic countries has 
not been maintained resulting in increasing 
tension on religious and cultural issues, such 
as the discussion about the ability of Islam to 
adjust its value system to the modern world. 
On the other hand, Islamic extremist could 
be observed for more than a decade doing 
everything to pursue a course of action of 
politicizing culture and religion in accordance 
with their belief that Islam is the solution to 
everything, therefore, this long running process 
support the creation of an unreflected paradigm 
of Islam versus the West.
Given this background the approach of 
cultural differance must be supplemented with 
the perspective of cooperative coexistence. 
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Mutual interest in and understanding of each 
others culture, history, and social relations are 
a necessary condition for the dialogue of the 
West with Islamic states and societies. Such a 
dialogue should not only underline similiarities 
between both cultures but also identify possible 
areas of conflict in order to mark the positive 
potential of religious, cultural and political 
exchange between both regions which are very 
heteregoneous within them and, at the same 
time, share a common history.41
As tension in the relationship between 
Western and Islamic cultures-civilizations have 
been growing, any kind of dialogue, therefore, 
has not only to be intensified but must take 
into consideration the changing situasion of 
world politics.
Indonesian Muslim and Crisis
Indonesia, as the largest Muslim country, 
therefore, after the fall of President Soeharto, 
can be regarged as a champion of democracy 
or at least democratic transition for a Muslim 
nation, although this must still be tested by the 
passage of time. It is natural that the West has 
viewed Indonesian Islam, at least before the 
Bali bombing, as being Islam with a new face. 
In 1996, international media called Islam in 
Indonesia modernist, progressive, and a friend 
of the West and other cultures-civilizations 
and perceived it as an example of succesful 
harmony between muslim and modernity. 
But, to borrow Anthony Reida’s perspec-
tive, that Indonesian Islam still remains a 
grossly understudied world  appears to be 
true today ever more than before. So, it is 
41 Norbert Eschborn,  “Democratization and the 
Issue of Terrorism in Indonesia,”  presentation in 
seminar, Bandung: Universitas Parahyangan & Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), 2004.
very timely to the West societies for  research 
and study on Indonesian Islam  that actually 
is very pluralistic and  complicated, so often 
misunderstood by the Westerners. Of course, 
issue of terrorism is a real matter, especially 
after Bali bombing that has schocked our state 
and society. Meanwhile, the radical movements 
in Indonesia have been rising such as Darul 
Islam, FPI, HizbutTahrir Indonesia, Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia, Angkatan Mujahidin 
Islam Nusantara, Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnahwal 
Jama’ah, Jamaah Tarbiyah Indonesia, Ikatan 
Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia, Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia, KPPSI and soon. These 
particular movements, which have been among 
the most prominent and influential, have all 
been motivated by common fears, anxieties, and 
desires that seem to be a not unusual response 
to some of the peculiar difficulties of life in the 
modern secular world. 
We are sure that, facing terrorism 
and Islam fundamentalism, no way out to 
solve the issues, except with cultural and 
civilizational dialogues and economic deve-
lopment cooperation between the West and 
Indonesia. These dialogues and cooperation 
are very  contextual and pivotal to eradicate 
poverty, social unjust, backwardness, and 
multidimentional crises  in Indonesian society, 
beside to improve mutual understanding.  
So far, Indonesian society has fallen into 
debt trap amounted to US$170 billions (state 
and private loans.) That foreign debt, mostly 
the odious debt,  has depleted economic 
resources of the people. Meanwhile imposition 
of Washington Consensus to Indonesia in 
conformity with IMF, World Bank and WTO 
guidelines, has burdened  the people economy in 
which most of them are the poor Muslims. From 
this sensitive point, Islam has been rallying 
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point to youth, students, ulamas and scholars  as 
a basic ideology  vis-a-vis the West hegemony 
that they blame as  the new imperialists in 
Indonesia under global capitalism.
Conclusion
But, is it Islam the only solution for every-
thing, included  as problem solver for poverty, 
social unjust and multidimentional crisis? 
Is it Islam the solution  to everything? The 
answer has not yet clear. In reality, Islam 
has only provided  values, ethics, norms and 
religious guides, not  an instant panacea to 
the real problems that grasped the Indonesian 
Islam. So it is imperative for ulamas (Islamic 
scholars), leaders and Muslim inteligensia to 
make their umma be aware and conscious that 
radicalism and violence is wrong answer in the 
wrong time to crackdown poverty, social unjust 
and  multidimensional crises in  recent years. 
Islam would be useful, beneficial and 
meaningful if it can provide real contri-
bution such as ideas, thinking, solution and 
philosophical/practical means  in dealing 
with the real issues, so that the Indonesian 
Islam is  more realistic and  pragmatic than 
radicalistic and fundamentalistic in responding 
the nowadays and future  challenges such as 
poverty, social injustices, global imbalances, 
under-development, environmental crisis, the 
widening gulf between the rich and the poor, 
between North and South and soon. Whether 
or not Indonesian Islam capable and  credible 
in dealing with these challenges, all of that 
depend upon their leaders, intellectuals and 
ulamas in responding the issues intellligently, 
directively, adequately and effectively. For 
the Muslim in every where,  the struggle to 
overcome that matters, would take time in such 
globalized world.
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